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Abstract
This paper assesses the impact of the Liquidity Program for Growth Sustainability
(LPGS) on Latin America and the Caribbean, instrumented by the IDB to confront the
regional spillovers of the subprime crisis. This emergency liquidity line was set up to
boost productive loans of commercial banks, channeled through a second-tier scheme.
The empirical strategy revolves around GARCH models to test whether the public
announcement of negotiations and of loan approval have had any impact on high
frequency macroeconomic data, such as the country risk premium and the interbank
interest rate. Our evidence reveals a positive and significant effect on financial stability
attributable to LPGS in Jamaica, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic and
Panama. We additionally discuss the rationale of key LPGS’ design features and the
observed outcomes.
(*) I’d like to acknowledge the insightful comments on a previous version from Kurt Focke, Olver Bernal,
Edgardo Demaestri, Morgan Doyle, Felipe Gómez-Acebo, and Juan Ketterer. The usual disclaimer applies.
Introduction
As a direct response to the local and international credit crunch associated to the recent
subprime crisis, the IDB launched in the fourth quarter of 2008 the Liquidity Program for
Growth Sustainability (henceforth, LPGS) to provide short-term resources to LAC non-
financial firms. This emergency liquidity line, created as a way of preserving an adequate
flow of productive loans, was especially (but not exclusively) directed towards micro,
small and medium enterprises needing working capital and trade financing. Loans were
to be made directly to national governments, central banks, or second tier financial
institutions with sovereign guarantees, and subsequently channeled to financial
institutions meeting basic conditions of liquidity, solvency, corporate governance and
portfolio quality. The IDB allocated a maximum amount of US$ 6 billion to be disbursed
in total and the maximum amount of US$ 500 million by country, a limit that made this
line particularly attractive only for small economies. Given the emergency they were
supposed to address, operating guidelines were prepared to facilitate a rapid
disbursement. With a 5-year maturity, 3-year grace period and soft eligibility rules, these
loans were well-suited to tackle the acute illiquidity faced by local firms.
As can be seen in Table 1, nine countries expressed interest in participating but
disbursement actually took place in just two of them (El Salvador and Jamaica), and even
in these cases the credit line was only partially used. This information will be exploited
throughout the paper to establish how LPGS acts on financial stability and why some
countries went ahead in the negotiation process and others opted for an early withdrawal
from the program.
Table 1
Execution of LPGS
As of November 24, 2009
Country
Agreed
Loan
Amount
(US$
million)
IDB Board
and
Country
Approval
Amount
Disbursed
so far
(US$
million)
Local Counterpart
El Salvador 400 Yes 188
Central Bank with
surveillance by
Banco Multilateral
de Inversiones
Costa Rica 500 Yes 0 Central Bank
Jamaica 300 Yes 74 Central Bank
Dominican
Rep. 300 Yes 0 Central Bank
Panama 500 Yes 0 Banco Nacional dePanamá
Guatemala Pending Pending 0
Barbados Pending Pending 0
Ecuador Pending Pending 0
Paraguay 200 Pending 0
Recalling that the subprime crisis has represented the deepest worldwide economic slump
since the 1930s, and thus the hardest external shock on LAC economies in decades,
LPGS was a priori a timely and well-conceived measure to cushion the productive
contraction that interrupted the prior five-year bonanza. Calvo (2009) and Fernández-
Arias, Powell and Rebucci (2009) explain why, on theoretical grounds, multilaterals are
well-equipped to intervene during crisis times in countries facing constraints in the
implementation of countercyclical (fiscal and monetary) policies and lacking sufficient
credit access from international creditors. Given the global nature and spillovers of the
crisis, the exacerbated systemic risk at the national level and the difficulties to assess
country’s fundamentals, there appears to be a role for the IDB and other multilateral
institutions as providers of backstop liquidity or lenders of last resort. Analysts highlight,
though, that the possibility to obtain easy financing when voluntary markets dry up may
induce borrower and private lender moral hazard. Dreher (2004) surveys the literature on
moral hazard behavior from IMF programs, and finds that there is overall evidence in
favor of this belief. However, this outcome is less likely to arise whenever contractual
conditions clearly highlight, as in the LPGS initiative, the exceptionality, short-term
maturity and higher-than-usual cost of the borrowing facility, plus the fact that the line
was planned to assist the private sector rather than filling fiscal gaps.
Hard evidence has not yet been produced, though, as to whether this new credit line has
exerted the intended stability effect by econometrically examining the impact of LPGS-
related public news on financial assets’ prices and volumes using high frequency data.
Our main goal is precisely to put to the test this hypothesis. Furthermore, we will explore
whether such impact, if present, has worked out as an actual liquidity provision
mechanism or as a signaling device, by which the mere announcement of prospective
access to the loan brings on a positive turn in market expectations, even if ex post the
loan is not actually granted. To this end, we have classified public news into two
categories: “Negotiation” and “Loan Approval” announcements. As explained later on,
our analytical framework will heavily borrow from the event study methodology, applied
on the five countries with formal IDB approval to enter the program: El Salvador,
Jamaica, Costa Rica, Panama, and Dominican Republic. Additionally, we will pay
attention to the case of Uruguay which, despite not participating in the program, was
benefited by the anticipated disbursement of another previously approved credit line as a
way to alleviate liquidity pressures.
The paper will be structured as follows. In Section 1 we will describe major
macroeconomic developments in the countries of interest over the 2005-2009 period, to
have a first grasp at why the situation warranted the IDB intervention and, later on, the
country’s decision to opt out of the program. Section 2 will carefully go over LPGS
chronology in each country, so as to pinpoint the exact days at which information was
disseminated to the public –this is the essential input to date the events whose market
impact we intend to gauge. As part of the same section, we will introduce the high
frequency data we will rely upon afterwards, underlying in particular their behavior
around LPGS key dates in each country. The research methodology and background, as
well as our empirical findings, will be discussed in Section 3. We will close with some
reflections on LPGS’ design features and outcomes.
Section 1: Subprime Crisis and the Macroeconomic Impact on LPGS Borrowers
It is well-known that the financial turmoil hitting the US economy since mid-2007 took a
heavy, yet relatively short-lived, toll on the industrial and developing world (see IMF
(2009) and World Bank (2009)). The initial diagnosis was that the peculiar features of the
crisis, in conjunction with the prudent fiscal and reserve accumulation policies put
forward during the preceding economic upswing, would spare the LAC region and
emerging countries at large (see Pineda, Pérez-Caldentey and Titelman (2009)). Counter
to this view, the aggravation of the crisis from the second semester of 2008 on proved the
decoupling hypothesis wrong, as contagion set off through trade and financial
transmission channels. Inexorably the crisis spilled over small and open LAC countries,
leading to a scenario of financial distress in which authorities put in place a variety of
fiscal, monetary and social policies to confront the bleak economic circumstances (see
ECLAC (2009) for details on the measures taken in each LAC country).
Graphs 1 through 7 display the evolution of some key real and financial variables in the
six countries under study in the quarterly period spanning 2005.4 to 2009.3. Graph 1
gives account gives account of the deceleration in real GDP growth from the soaring
levels in 2005-2007 to modest and even negative figures in some cases from 2008 on.
Deflationary pressures ensue starting in 2008.3 as output growth was losing pace (Graph
2).
Exchange rates against the US dollar also reflect the external liquidity problems, but
without showing a uniform reaction across countries, as evident in Graph 3. To start,
dollarization in El Salvador and Panama rules out this financial channel, but even in other
countries, prominently in Uruguay and Dominican Republic, the devaluation pace did not
seem to have changed in the aftermath of the crisis. In opposition, the Jamaican dollar
and the Costa Rican colon depreciated by 25.1% and 17.7% between 2007.4 and 2009.3.
International reserves (Graph 4) did not take either any significant dip in none of the
countries: the stock in 2009.4 was above the 2008.3 level in all cases, with just the
exception of Jamaica. A more discernible pattern comes up in the current account (Graph
5). In 2008.2 and 2008.3 previously growing deficits quickly start to revert towards
balance or surplus, as in Uruguay and Costa Rica, in response to slower economic growth
and restricted access to foreign credit.
According to Graphs 6 and 7, the volume and interest rate on bank deposits do not
convey any signs of the uncertainty reigning during the peak of the international crisis.
But the assets side of the banking system offers a different perspective, as the private
credit volume reaches a temporary plateau since 2008.3-2008.4, with sluggish rates of
growth compared to the previous trajectory.1 A similar impression emerges from the loan
interest rates, which increase starting in 2008.2, save for Panama and Uruguay.
In sum, this succinct review shows that the crisis’ effects become especially visible when
looking at indicators of the real economy (such as GDP growth and the inflation rate),
external transactions (such as the current account) and domestic credit (volume and cost
of loans to the private sector), but not other domestic financial conditions (such as
deposits, interest rate, exchange rate, and international reserves). This is consistent with a
scenario of international liquidity shortage –less capital inflows- but calmer local
domestic markets on account of better standards of fiscal discipline and international
reserves accumulation than in past crises. Incidentally, the observed hardening of private
credit conditions provides a direct rationale for the IDB actions directed at financing
SMEs.
1 This is a stylized feature of financial crises in the region, where credit growth slows down, but still keeps
growing at positive real and nominal rates (see Bebczuk (2005)).
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Section 2: LPGS Time Line and Macroeconomic Data
In this section we present the sequence of LPGS-related events in El Salvador, Jamaica,
Panama, Costa Rica and Dominican Republic, plus Uruguay, and then we make a first,
quick inspection of the macroeconomic series around the day such events were made
public. As mentioned earlier, these events are the crucial input for our empirical work in
Section 3 and 4, as we seek to assess the impact of unexpected and public LPGS news on
selected financial variables. The information was extracted from national newspapers and
the IDB internet portal after a thorough searching process.
Tables 2 through 7 reproduce all the events we have assembled regarding (i) the
announcement of the program by the IDB and by the national authorities, (ii) the contract
approval by the IDB Board and the signature by the local government, (iii) the allocation
of funds to the private sector, and (iv) the opinions of interested parties from both the
public and private sector about the actual benefits and problems with LPGS financing.
We have also included news connected to fresh loans agreed by other multilaterals
besides the IDB, just to take note of simultaneous supranational efforts to struggle with
the crisis. However, as far the econometric analysis is concerned, we will only consider
(i) and (ii).2
In order to conduct our econometric analysis on the impact of LPGS on financial
stability, we have selected the following time series: the interbank interest rate in El
Salvador, Costa Rica, and Dominican Republic; the country risk premium (as measured
by the JP Morgan’s Emerging Markets Bond Index) in Panama and Uruguay; and the
international reserves in Jamaica. The choice of these variables was dictated by two
binding technical requirements –as a matter of fact, we only could come up with a single
series per country meeting these requirements. For one, daily data (or at least data with
higher-than-monthly frequency) is needed for the application of the econometric method.
2 In the cases of El Salvador and Jamaica, where disbursement actually took place, contract signature by
national authorities is most likely to coincide with disbursement. Even if the latter occurred at a later date
(an information we do not have), it is debatable whether this would matter at all for our work, as what
counts as the event is the certainty that the funds are available –disbursement should have been fully
internalized by then.
As these small countries have quite limited coverage by international data providers (like
Reuters or Bloomberg) and possess shallow and illiquid domestic financial markets, the
number of suitable series is notoriously scarce. On top of this, central banks only disclose
monthly or lower frequency data, and so we were forced to make direct inquiries to
central bank authorities in charge of the statistical processing to gain access to daily data.
Still, in El Salvador and Jamaica, we needed to settle for bi-monthly information.
Secondly, the series must display sufficient volatility and be sensitive enough to market
sentiment swings so as to make sure that they capture the confidence effect of LPGS
news we are testing (to give an extreme example, a fixed exchange rate is not suitable for
our purposes).
In the graphs we have drawn a vertical line at each date at which a relevant news, as
displayed in Tables 2 through 7, was disseminated about the start of negotiations or the
formal signature of the agreement. A worth noting common element is that disbursement
took place only in countries that, at the moment of loan signature, were going through
troubled financial times, meaning that the series were far away from normal levels in
mean and variance. That is the case of El Salvador, Jamaica, and Uruguay. In contrast, by
the time the deal was formally under way in Panama, Dominican Republic and Costa
Rica, the series were conveying the impression that financial stability was already being
restored.3
3 Indeed, the drop in the interbank interest rate in Costa Rica initiated in late October 2008 came to a stop
in early February 2009, when it enters a new period of high volatility. Anyway, the Costa Rican authorities
decided to withdraw from LPGS as of May 2009 (and formally in June 2009). The most likely explanation
is that the country had gained access to sizable contingent credit lines from the IMF.
Table 2
El Salvador: LPGS Chronology
Date News
10-13-2008 IDB announces LPGS for a total US$6,000 million, along with
credit lines from Corporación Andina de  Fomento (US$1,500
million) and Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas (US$1,800
million). All LAC countries are in principle eligible.
11-12-2008 El Salvador’s Banking Association announces US$500 million
IDB loan
11-13-2008 President announces US$500 million to be lent by IDB
11-18-2008 President and Central Bank President announce US$500
million to be lent under LPGS. The loan was already approved
by IDB Board and is expected to be disbursed in early
December 2008
11-18-2008 President also announces negotiations with Central American
Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE) for another US$300
million emergency loan
12-19-2008 US$400 million loan approved by the IDB Board on 12-17-
2008 and contract signed with El Salvador
12-19-2008 Original offer of US$500 million loan reduced by US$100
million
12-23-2008 El Salvador looks for precautionary credit agreement with the
IMF
12-24-2008 First US$37 million LPGS loan disbursed, according to
official Central Bank information
01-16-2009 IMF approves stand by credit agreement for US$ 800 million
01-28-2009 Businessmen complain about lack of access to LPGS funds
02-11-2009 US$ 113,4 million already disbursed under LPGS
03-03-2009 US$155.2 million already disbursed as of 02-23-2009 out of
total US$400 million, according to official Central Bank
information. Up to 02-16-2009, 379 new loans for US$70.8
were granted.
03-08-2009 President of El Salvador complains about high cost of LPGS
04-14-2009 Salvadorean firms express concerns about lack of access to
LPGS-financed loans
04-15-2009 US$187.2 million disbursed until 04-13-2009, according to
official Central Bank information.
06-03-2009 Additional IDB loans to be made in 2010
Sources: www.iadb.org/NEWS/, www.elsalvador.com/mwedh/, www.laprensagrafica.com,
www.elmundo.com.sv, www.elgrafico.com, www.radiolaprimerisima.com,
www.americaeconomia.com, www.sdpnoticias.com, www.centralamericalink.com
Table 3
Jamaica: LPGS Chronology
Date News
10-13-2008 IDB announces LPGS for a total US$6,000 million,
along with credit lines from Corporación Andina de
Fomento (US$1,500 million) and Fondo
Latinoamericano de Reservas (US$1,800 million). All
LAC countries are in principle elegible.
12-16-2008 Jamaica negotiates LPGS with IDB
01-15-2009 World Bank approves US$100 million emergency loan
01-16-2009 IDB approves US$300 million LPGS loan
09-20-2009 Local banks show mixed results in channeling LPGs
funds to the private sector. The finance ministry informs
that US$89.7 million has already been loaned, with 71
per cent going to the private sector and the balance taken
up by government companies, which have not been
named. Only four financial houses - National
Commercial Bank (NCB), First Global Bank, Pan
Caribbean Financial Services and the Export Import
(EXIM) Bank - have taken up any of the funds, which
are being administered by the Development Bank of
Jamaica (DBJ).
Sources: www.iadb.org/NEWS, www.jamaica-gleaner.com, www.jamaicaobserver.com,
www.caribbeannetnews.com.
Table 4
Costa Rica: LPGS Chronology
Date News
10-13-2008 IDB announces LPGS for a total US$6,000 million,
along with credit lines from Corporación Andina de
Fomento (US$1,500 million) and Fondo
Latinoamericano de Reservas (US$1,800 million). All
LAC countries are in principle elegible.
12-18-2008 IDB approves US$500 million LPGS loan
04-13-2009 IMF approves contingent credit line for US$ 735 million
04-30-2009 IMF approves contingent credit line for US$ 500 million
05-11-2009 The government considers rejecting new offers of
multilateral loans, including those from the IDB
06-12-2009 The government withdraws the application to enter
LPGS, originally submitted in October 2008
06-18-2009 Congress and Central Bank decide to call off LPGS,
claiming that the interest rate is too high for a
multilateral credit line
09-25-2009 IMF approves contingent credit line for US$ 65 million
Sources: www.iadb.org/NEWS, www.asamblea.go.cr/actual/boletin.
Table 5
Panama: LPGS Chronology
Date News
10-13-2008 IDB announces LPGS for a total US$6,000 million,
along with credit lines from Corporación Andina de
Fomento (US$1,500 million) and Fondo
Latinoamericano de Reservas (US$1,800 million).
All LAC countries are in principle elegible.
03-28-2009 Corporación Andina de Fomento signs US$210
million liquidity support loan with Panama
04-16-2009 IDB approves US$500 million loan under LPGS
Sources: www.iadb.org/NEWS, www.revistasumma.com.
Table 6
Dominican Republic: LPGS Chronology
Date News
10-13-2008 IDB announces LPGS for a total US$6,000 million,
along with credit lines from Corporación Andina de
Fomento (US$1,500 million) and Fondo
Latinoamericano de Reservas (US$1,800 million). All
LAC countries are in principle elegible.
12-09-2008 President announces negotiations for US$500 million
LPGS loan (plus another US$ 180 million for
competitiveness improvement)
03-20-2009 IDB approves US$300 million loan under LPGS
03-27-2009 US$300 million loan contract signed
04-13-2009 LPGS loan and an additional IDB US$100 million are
sent for Congress ratification
06-24-2009 Central Bank meets with commercial banks to discuss
possible uses and contractual conditions for LPGS loan
05-25-2009 Senate approves LPGS loan
11-13-2009 National Congress ratifies a package, submitted by the
Executive, for US$1,586.9 million loans granted by
several international institutions, including IDB’s
LPGS, between August 2008 and November 2009
Sources: www.iadb.org/NEWS, lta.reuters.com, www.creditopublico.gov.do/novedades,
www.diariolibre.com, www.asiex.org/index.php, www.lanaciondominicana.com,
www.elnuevodiario.com.do.
Table 7
Uruguay: LPGS Chronology
Date News
10-13-2008 IDB announces LPGS for a total US$6,000 million,
along with credit lines from Corporación Andina de
Fomento (US$1,500 million) and Fondo
Latinoamericano de Reservas (US$1,800 million). All
LAC countries are in principle elegible.
10-16-2008 Minister of Economy claims that Uruguay have
multilateral open credit lines for US$1,860, plus
potential US$500 million from LPGS
10-18-2008 IDB speeds up previously agreed loans for US$200
million for social expenditures
10-23-2008 World Bank announces US$300 million contingent
credit line for Uruguay
12-11-2008 Minister of Economy announces IDB loan for US$300
million to be used during 2009, but that the country
declines LPGS
02-04-2009 World Bank announces US$400 million loan for
Uruguay
Sources: www.iadb.org/NEWS, www.elpais.com.uy, www.presidencia.gub.uy.
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Section 3: Empirical Methodology and Results
We will implement a simple yet potent framework to uncover the effect of LPGS on
financial stability in countries that either effectively entered the program (El Salvador and
Jamaica) or were accepted into the program but in the end declined to participate (Costa
Rica, Dominican Republic, and Panama). We will also include Uruguay which, despite
passing the invitation to enter LPGS, was conceded a quicker disbursement of pre-agreed
loans, implying a liquidity support objective largely similar to that of LPGS. In short, we
will scrutinize the behavior of the macroeconomic series introduced in the last section
and investigate, based on econometric techniques, whether LPGS-related news had a
stabilizing impact.
This methodology derives from the event study technique, intensively applied in the
finance arena to assess the impact of unanticipated corporate news on stock returns (see
Kothari and Warner (2008)). A handful of studies have followed some variation of this
approach to evaluate the incidence of IMF programs during the Mexican and especially
the Asian financial crises in emerging countries, among them Evrensel and Kutan (2008),
Hayo and Kutan (2005) and Eichengreen, Kletzer and Mody (2005). Either sovereign
bonds spreads or stock market returns are the typical dependent variable in these studies.
Mixed results were obtained regarding the sign of the relationship between asset returns
and IMF-related news. However, comparability to the present study is limited due to the
nature and scope of IMF programs and the public opinion reaction to them. For instance,
traditional IMF programs used to impose stringent macroeconomic conditionalities,
which might trigger negative expectations on future growth. In contrast, most IDB loans,
and LPGS in particular, are free from these side effects.4
Specifically, our event studies will be run with a GARCH model, where GARCH stands
for Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (Engle (2005) and
Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997), among others, are helpful references). The most
4 The Flexible Credit Line put in place by the IMF since 2008 is more akin to LPGS than traditional
lending operations. See IMF (2009a through c) for official documents in reference to the cases of Mexico,
Colombia and Poland, respectively.
appealing property of this modeling strategy is that it simultaneously estimates a standard
regression and a volatility regression. Time-varying volatility is typical of high frequency
financial data. Volatility autocorrelation or clustering, which is most likely to occur
during crises, violating the Gauss-Markov homokedasticity assumption. Under
heteroskedasticity, coefficients are still unbiased but display too low standard deviations,
which gives a false sense of precision. Instead of trying to correct this problem by
modifying the variance-covariance matrix, GARCH models treat variance as another
variable to be estimated. 5 To do so, they take as the best predictor for the current
variance a weighted average of the long-run variance -based on the information available
up to the last period- and the most recent squared residual. Rather than assumed, the
weights are estimated during the process.6 Maximum likelihood is employed to estimate
the parameters after substituting in the normal distribution the variance parameter for its
sample counterpart.
Our econometric specification will take the following form:
tttt Dryy    312110 (1)
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Equation (1) is our main equation, where y stands for the dependent variable (the daily or
bi-monthly series presented in Section 2), which is explained by its first lag, the lagged
S&P500 index return (r), the LPGS-related news (our variable of interest) represented by
the dummies vector D, and an error term . Controlling for autocorrelation (financial
series tend to exhibit inertial behavior) and for international contagion (during the
subprime crisis it was evident that international news heavily influenced local markets) is
necessary to avoid any omitted variable bias. The dummy variable D takes a value 1 the
5 The construction of robust standard errors properly addresses the lack of homoskedasticity when the
sample is sufficiently large, as this estimator only possesses asymptotic properties. Conversely, small
samples do not guarantee that these properties are met.
6 To ensure stationarity, the sum of these two weights must be statistically below one. In turn, a sensible
result should be that each individual weight be positive, implying that the variance is actually persistent
over time estimated and that larger estimated errors are variance grows with past variance and
day the information is publicly disclosed, with a value 0 otherwise.7 We distinguish two
cases: one dummy is defined by the public announcement of the negotiation process (the
“LPGS Announcement” dummy), taking value 1 the day the program was launched by
the IDB and the day formal negotiations with the country kicked off; and the other takes
value 1 the day the loan was approved by the IDB and the day the contract with the
country was signed (the “LPGS Approval” dummy).8
In turn, the error term has a time-varying variance given by equation (2). In this standard
GARCH(1,1), this variance depends on its own first lag and on the lagged error.
Additionally, we also include the LPGS dummy to verify whether the IDB program
affected the series volatility as well. Equation (1) is usually referred to as mean equation,
and Equation (2), nested into the model, is the variance equation.
Regression outputs are presented in full in Tables 11 through 16, with one table per
country (El Salvador, Jamaica, Costa Rica, Panama, Dominican Republic, and Uruguay).
But, for the sake of expositional clarity, Tables 8 through 10 summarize the statistical and
economic significance of the estimated coefficients. These self-explanatory tables reveal
that: (a) Financial series display a strong inertia and are heavily influenced by market
developments in the US, as measured by S&P500 index return; (b) The negotiation and
approval dummies deliver a significant estimate with the expected sign for the mean
equation in 10 out of the 12 cases listed in the Table 8; (c) In turn, these dummies have a
significant impact on the variance equation in 6 out of 12 cases; and (d) Regarding
economic significance, coefficients vary across cases, but the average effect is a
reasonable improvement of 11.2% in the mean value and of 9.8% in variance.
7 To check our results, we also ran regressions assigning a value 1 to the day after the information is
released, as it is possible that it may take some additional time for the market as a whole to receive and act
on the news, or the information may have been made public after the markets close that day. In general, but
not in all cases, we found that the original dummy variable (without considering a delayed effect) was
enough to capture the effect.
8 Although we have combined two different dates in constructing each dummy variable, from the
perspective of news impact on the market, the actual start of the negotiations and the IDB approval stand
out as the most important dates (the announcement of the facility by the IDB does not guarantee that any
particular countries will be eligible, while contract signature is visualized as a formality after the decisive
IDB Board approval).This hypothesis was generally confirmed via additional unreported regressions.
In closing, we take note of the shortcomings of research approach.9 The chief underlying
assumptions of these models are that: (a) News are not anticipated at all by the market. If
that were the case, the estimation would yield a non-significant coefficient on the news
dummy regardless of the true impact of the emergency program. Unfortunately it is hard
to know with any certainty whether the market discounted the information in advance or
if there was some leakages in previous days; and (b) No other major news were disclosed
around the same time. Although it is unlikely that long-term fundamentals change over
the short time windows employed here, it is sensible nonetheless that LPGS-news overlap
with other positive news –like similar liquidity support initiatives by other multilaterals
or well-received domestic policy measures- or with negative news –like gloomy
economic projections, adverse developments in international markets, or resonant cabinet
changes-. Coincidence with other positive news may lead to an overestimation of the true
impact of the LPGS program; coincidence with bad news may have the opposite effect.
As mentioned before, we took reasonable steps to deal with this problem: first, we
compiled news on multilateral packages for liquidity assistance, which were presented in
Section 2, along with the IDB program; and second, we controlled for persistence in the
dependent variable and for external news, proxied by the S&P500 index return.
We acknowledge that every event study, including ours, is not fully able to rule out a
potential over- or underestimation of news impact owing to the simultaneous arrival of
other good or bad news to the market, although we have done our best to control for these
extraneous factors. Also, this sort of analysis remains silent as to the LPGS’ longer-term
effects, which are still more difficult to quantify. Besides the econometric exercises
presented earlier, we stretched the news windows until the end of the estimation period.
In this way, the news dummy took a value of 1 not only on the announcement day but in
all remaining days spanning the estimation (typically a month after the announcement).
This procedure allows us to evaluate if the news had a longer (rather than immediate)
impact on the macroeconomic data. Our results (unreported but available upon request)
indicate that the negotiation dummy has this longer effect only in Costa Rica, while the
approval dummy is significant in all countries but Uruguay and Jamaica. It is unlikely
9 It is important to bear in mind that these shortcomings are common to all event studies, although they are
usually assumed away without further consideration.
that this or any other method could detect much longer LPGS effects on financial
stability. Although it has proven useful over short periods, it is to be expected that the
arrival of bad international and domestic news bombarding the market every day,
combined with the specificity, non-recurring nature and limited volume involved of
LPGS, have turned the latter a limited tool to revert pessimism by itself on a permanent
basis. However, the fact that it seems to have had a stabilizing effect in the short-term,
and that short-term stability is a precondition for long-term growth, speaks highly of this
anti-crisis IDB program.
Table 8
Statistical significance of the
LPGS “Negotiation” and “Approval” Dummies (*)
Country DependentVariable
Estimated Coefficient on
Lagged
Dependent
Variable
Lagged
S&P500
Index
Return
LPGS
Negotiation
Dummy
(Mean
Equation)
LPGS
Approval
Dummy
(Mean
Equation)
LPGS
Negotiation
Dummy
(Variance
Equation)
LPGS
Approval
Dummy
(Variance
Equation)
El
Salvador
Interbank
Interest Rate + - - 0 - -
Jamaica InternationalReserves + + + + 0 0
Costa Rica InterbankInterest Rate + - - - - 0
Panama CountryRisk + 0 - - - 0
Dominican
Republic
Interbank
Interest Rate + 0 0 - 0 -
Uruguay CountryRisk + - - - - 0
(*) (+) Positive and significant at 10% or less, (-) Negative and significant at 10% or less, (0) Non-significant at 10% or less.
Table 9
Mean Equation:
Economic significance of the
LPGS “Negotiation” and “Approval” Dummies (*)
Country DependentVariable
Impact of Dummy Estimate on Dependent Variable (*)
LPGS Negotiation
Dummy (Mean Equation)
LPGS
Approval
Dummy (Mean Equation)
El Salvador InterbankInterest Rate -36.1% 0
Jamaica InternationalReserves +2.6% +2.0%
Costa Rica InterbankInterest Rate -7.8% -35.6%
Panama Country Risk -7.2% -4.1%
Dominican
Republic
Interbank
Interest Rate 0 -11.4%
Uruguay Country Risk -1.9% -3.0%
(*) Calculated as (Point Estimate on Dummy Variable) / (Mean Value of Dependent Variable over the estimation period).
A value of zero (0) means that the estimated coefficient was statistically not significant at 10% or less.
Table 10
Variance Equation:
Economic significance of the
LPGS “Negotiation” and “Approval” Dummies (*)
Country DependentVariable
Impact of Dummy Estimate on Dependent Variable (*)
LPGS Negotiation
Dummy (Mean Equation)
LPGS
Approval
Dummy (Mean Equation)
El Salvador InterbankInterest Rate -2.3% 0
Jamaica InternationalReserves 0 0
Costa Rica InterbankInterest Rate -25.6% 0
Panama Country Risk -1.3% 0
Dominican
Republic
Interbank
Interest Rate 0 -19.8%
Uruguay Country Risk -0.06% 0
(*) Calculated as (Point Estimate on Dummy Variable) / (Mean Value of Dependent Variable over the estimation period).
A value of zero (0) means that the estimated coefficient was statistically not significant at 10% or less.
Table 11
El Salvador: LPGS Effects on the Interbank Interest Rate
Bollerslev-Wooldridge Robust Standard Errors
Dep. Var.: Interbank interest rate (1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Equation
Constant 0.261 0.21* 0.217 0.30
(1.598) (1.875) (1.561) (0.902)
Interbank interest rate(-1) 0.940*** 0.954*** 0.953*** 0.906***
(20.482) (28.33) (22.094) (9.754)
S&P 500 Return(-1) -0.051** -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.040
(-1.969) (-4.070) (-3.906) (-1.321)
LPGS Announcement Dummy -1.500*** -0.817*
(-4.302) (-1.673)
LPGS Approval Dummy -0.017 -0.006
(-0.198) (-0.026)
Variance Equation
Constant 0.016 0.007 0.014 0.007
(1.104) (0.508) (1.379) (0.508)
ARCH(-1) 1.217** 2.06*** 1.864*** 2.06***
(1.976) (3.584) (3.339) (3.584)
GARCH(-1) 0.264* 0.125 0.103 0.125
(1.655) (0.969) (0.971) (0.969)
LPGS Announcement Dummy -0.0186***
(-3.322)
LPGS Approval Dummy -0.681***
(-4.208)
Bi-monthly period 05/30/08 -01/30/09
05/30/08 -
01/30/09
05/30/08 -
01/30/09
05/30/08 -
01/30/09
No. observations 36 36 36 36
Mean of dependent variable 4.15 4.15 4.15 4.15
S.D. of dependent variable 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70
R-squared 0.787 0.780 0.761 0.765
Adjusted R-squared 0.743 0.726 0.711 0.706
Log likelihood -28.09 -26.19 -27.54 -39.64
F-statistic 17.835 14.217 15.37 13.00
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LM ARCH test F-statistic (5 lags) 1.973 0.701 0.763 1.669
Probability LM ARCH test (5 lags) 0.169 0.408 0.389 0.205
Q-stat (5 lags) 6.096 5.355 5.499 7.905
Probability Q-stat (5 lags) 0.297 0.374 0.358 0.162
Notes:
* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Z-statistics in parenthesis.
Table 12
Jamaica: LPGS Effects on International Reserves
Bollerslev-Wooldridge Robust Standard Errors
Dep. Var.: International Reserves (1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Equation
Constant 71.86 73.01 73.638 74.825
(0.88) (0.88) (0.915) (0.963)
International reserves(-1) 0.959*** 0.96*** 0.959*** 0.959***
(24.162) (23.65) (24.287) (25.148)
S&P 500 Return(-1) 5.249* 5.179* 5.399* 5.329**
(1.761) (1.718) (1.798) (2.023)
LPGS Announcement Dummy 50.617*** 50.581***
(3.773) (4.077)
LPGS Approval Dummy 38.275** 38.253***
(2.473) (4.077)
Variance Equation
Constant 5536.3*** 8518.0*** 5555.6*** 8547.7*
(3.966) (5.283) (3.985) (1.711)
ARCH(-1) -0.104 -0.144 -0.105 -0.145
(-1.236) (-1.487) (-1.259) (-1.506)
GARCH(-1) 0.529*** 0.460*** 0.528*** 0.463
(4.875) (3.878) (4.918) (1.139)
LPGS Announcement Dummy -0.086
(0.000)
LPGS Approval Dummy -0.076
(0.000)
Bi-monthly period 04/23/08 -10/14/09
04/23/08 -
10/14/09
04/23/08 -
10/14/09
04/23/08 -
10/14/09
No. observations 36 36 36 36
Mean of dependent variable 1,948.3 1,948.3 1,948.3 1,948.3
S.D. of dependent variable 296.8 296.8 296.8 296.8
R-squared 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.900
Adjusted R-squared 0.879 0.876 0.879 0.876
Log likelihood -210.5 -211.41 -210.46 -211.41
F-statistic 43.67 36.21 43.51 36.21
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LM ARCH test F-statistic (5 lags) 0.249 0.281 0.248 0.281
Probability LM ARCH test (5 lags) 0.936 0.919 0.937 0.919
Q-stat (5 lags) 2.082 2.254 1.789 2.254
Probability Q-stat (5 lags) 0.838 0.813 0.877 0.813
Notes:
* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Z-statistics in parenthesis.
Table 13
Costa Rica: LPGS Effects on the Interbank Interest Rate
Bollerslev-Wooldridge Robust Standard Errors
Dep. Var.: Interbank interest rate (1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Equation
Constant 0.629*** 0.691*** 1.244*** 1.307**
(2.612) (1.504) (3.077) (2.382)
Interbank interest rate(-1) 0.931*** 0.483*** 0.692*** 0.692***
(36.81) (3.753) (8.074) (6.337)
S&P 500 Return(-1) -0.086*** -0.079*** -0.022 -0.044
(-4.421) (-2.114) (-0.485) (-0.746)
LPGS Announcement Dummy -0.561** -0.809***
(-2.139) (-3.545)
LPGS Approval Dummy -1.522*** -1.673***
(-6.785) (-4.939)
Variance Equation
Constant 0.014 0.655** 3.010*** 0.874
(0.989) (2.009) (5.625) (0.064)
ARCH(-1) 1.779*** 0.358* 0.066 0.006
(2.62) (1.667) (1.424) (0.048)
GARCH(-1) 0.22*** 0.262 -1.050*** 0.458
(2.869) (1.087) (-18.163) (0.055)
LPGS Announcement Dummy -1.404***
(-3.00)
LPGS Approval Dummy 0.170
(0.088)
Daily period 08/01/08 -11/28/08
08/01/08 -
11/28/08
11/03/08 -
01/14/09
11/03/08 -
01/14/09
No. observations 84 84 49 49
Mean of dependent variable 7.16 7.16 4.27 4.27
S.D. of dependent variable 2.34 2.34 1.81 1.81
R-squared 0.675 0.709 0.494 0.497
Adjusted R-squared 0.649 0.677 0.421 0.411
Log likelihood -113.25 -124.86 -79.08 -81.17
F-statistic 26.634 22.791 6.823 5.778
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LM ARCH test F-statistic (5 lags) 0.31 0.574 1.464 0.896
Probability LM ARCH test (5 lags) 0.905 0.719 0.224 0.494
Q-stat (5 lags) 2.057 5.509 3.689 3.234
Probability Q-stat (5 lags) 0.841 0.357 0.595 0.664
Notes:
* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Z-statistics in parenthesis.
Table 14
Panama: LPGS Effects on Country Risk Premium
Bollerslev-Wooldridge Robust Standard Errors
Dependent Variable: EMBI (1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Equation
Constant 16.116 16.982* -1.624 -4.087
(1.497) (1.714) (-0.207) (-0.434)
EMBI(-1) 0.836*** 0.707*** 0.999*** 1.005***
(6.184) (5.518) (55.21) (46.024)
S&P 500 Return(-1) 0.708 0.021 -0.103 -0.136
(0.867) (0.029) (-0.261) (-0.266)
LPGS Announcement Dummy -27.975*** -22.271***
(-2.817) (-2.60)
LPGS Approval Dummy -17.296*** -17.036***
(-12.884) (-10.795)
Variance Equation
Constant 352.726** 384.708** 9.734* 21.551
(3.156) (2.939) (1.808) (0.877)
ARCH(-1) 0.818** 0.908** -0.121* -0.051
(2.109) (2.427) (-1.756) (-0.084)
GARCH(-1) -0.036 -0.098 1.072*** 0.904***
(-0.708) (-0.968) (16.888) (4.756)
LPGS Announcement Dummy -202.834*
(-1.752)
LPGS Approval Dummy -44.726
(-0.462)
Daily period 09/02/08 -11/14/08
09/02/08 -
11/14/08
01/29/09 -
05/26/09
01/29/09 -
05/26/09
No. observations 54 54 81 81
Mean of dependent variable 385.91 385.91 425.6 425.6
S.D. of dependent variable 123.15 123.15 57.4 57.4
R-squared 0.94 0.94 0.958 0.958
Adjusted R-squared 0.929 0.928 0.955 0.954
Log likelihood -251.22 -251.23 -308.5 -312.04
F-statistic 87.914 77.281 283.89 240.9
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LM ARCH test F-statistic (5 lags) 0.935 0.838 1.144 0.757
Probability LM ARCH test (5 lags) 0.468 0.529 0.346 0.583
Q-stat (5 lags) 5.074 4.702 2.637 5.314
Probability Q-stat (5 lags) 0.407 0.453 0.756 0.379
Notes:
* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Z-statistics in parenthesis.
Regressions (1) and (2) include also the second and third lags of the EMBI to control for
autocorrelation, according to the Q test.
Table 15
Dominican Republic: LPGS Effects on Interbank Interest Rate
Bollerslev-Wooldridge Robust Standard Errors
Dep. Var.: Interbank interest rate (1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Equation
Constant 9.856*** 7.34*** 2.489*** 2.502***
(10.035) (7.299) (3.602) (6.475)
Interbank interest rate(-1) 0.352*** 0.519*** 0.766*** 0.747***
(5.407) (7.829) (11.444) (17.723)
S&P 500 Return(-1) -0.0017 -0.0013 -0.006 0.031
(-0.164) (-0.847) (-0.185) (0.718)
LPGS Announcement Dummy 0.093 -0.0027
(0.37) (-0.0088)
LPGS Approval Dummy -1.177*** -0.769
(-2.664) (-1.497)
Variance Equation
Constant 0.038 0.020 0.1056* 0.638**
(0.585) (0.761) (1.87) (2.026)
ARCH(-1) -0.048 0.077 -0.123 -0.136***
(-0.701) (1.545) (-1.597) (-2.594)
GARCH(-1) 1.015*** 0.841*** 0.991*** 0.482
(9.184) (7.764) (6.205) (1.467)
LPGS Announcement Dummy -0.063
(-0.536)
LPGS Approval Dummy -0.457*
(1.652)
Daily period 08/01/08 -12/09/08
08/01/08 -
12/09/08
02/02/09 -
03/30/09
02/02/09 -
03/30/09
No. observations 108 108 41 41
Mean of dependent variable 15.06 15.06 10.35 10.35
S.D. of dependent variable 0.829 0.829 1.52 1.52
R-squared 0.328 0.397 0.619 0.633
Adjusted R-squared 0.288 0.354 0.552 0.556
Log likelihood -77.87 -88.76 -48.454 -52.048
F-statistic 8.226 9.397 9.209 8.146
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LM ARCH test F-statistic (5 lags) 1.679 0.351 0.216 0.151
Probability LM ARCH test (5 lags) 0.147 0.88 0.953 0.978
Q-stat (5 lags) 1.071 2.039 3.193 1.711
Probability Q-stat (5 lags) 0.957 0.844 0.67 0.888
Notes:
Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Z-statistics in parenthesis.
Table 16
Uruguay: LPGS Effects on Country Risk Premium
Bollerslev-Wooldridge Robust Standard Errors
Dep. Var.: EMBI (1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Equation
Constant 4.328* 7.598** 8.372 7.775
(1.955) (2.368) (1.382) (1.222)
EMBI(-1) 1.094*** 1.168** 0.995*** 0.995***
(37.42) (77.361) (102.05) (98.52)
S&P 500 Return -3.211*** -2.977*** -3.09*** -3.202***
(5.281) (-7.918) (-8.029) (-8.015)
LPGS Announcement Dummy -10.720*** -7.542**
(-3.321) (-2.571)
LPGS Approval Dummy -17.365*** -12.08
(-2.707) (-0.581)
Variance Equation
Constant 465.86*** 389.79*** 213.33** 208.84**
(4.397) (4.903) (2.256) (2.232)
ARCH(-1) 0.551** 0.672*** 0.802** 0.756**
(2.354) (2.712) (2.426) (2.226)
GARCH(-1) -0.469*** -0.305*** -0.0032 -0.001
(-4.339) (-20.80) (-0.095) (-0.039)
LPGS Announcement Dummy -192.717***
(-3.452)
LPGS Approval Dummy 553.87
(0.792)
Daily period 08/27/08 -11/10/08
08/27/08 -
11/10/08
08/27/08 -
11/10/08
08/27/08 -
11/10/08
No. observations 54 54 54 54
Mean of dependent variable 573.15 573.15 573.15 573.15
S.D. of dependent variable 166.25 166.25 166.25 166.25
R-squared 0.974 0.976 0.968 0.968
Adjusted R-squared 0.969 0.972 0.964 0.964
Log likelihood -238.13 -237.42 -243.25 -242.80
F-statistic 243.06 231.61 236.78 201.53
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LM ARCH test F-statistic (5 lags) 0.561 0.202 0.288 0.445
Probability LM ARCH test (5 lags) 0.729 0.959 0.917 0.814
Q-stat (5 lags) 7.403 1.746 6.618 5.118
Probability Q-stat (5 lags) 0.192 0.883 0.251 0.402
Notes:
* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
Regressions (1) and (2) include also the second and third lags of the EMBI to control for
autocorrelation, according to the Q test.
Section 4: PGLS Rationale and Outcomes
At the time of its design, negotiation and implementation phases, LPGS invited a few
central questions as to how to maximize the effectiveness of IDB financial assistance
while the crisis was at its peak. The goal of this closing section is to move away from the
technicality of the previous analysis and discuss some operational aspects that have been
on the table since LPGS was launched in October 2008. Now, as the subprime crisis has
subsided, it seems a proper time to take stock.
Along with the review of IDB documentation (LPGS Operational Guidelines, Loan
Agreements, and related information), we maintained interviews with the Bank’s Team
Leaders and with national authorities of El Salvador, Costa Rica and Uruguay in order to
learn from their first hand experience. Here are the four issues we seek to go over:
(a) Why was the assistance oriented towards the private sector and not to the public
sector?
The quick answer is that the IDB is a development bank, and as such it is outside its
scope to play a lender-of-last-resort function at the regional level. Instead, its mission is
to provide resources with a direct impact on the productive capabilities of its country
members (by the way, the title of the program, in referring to growth sustainability, is
quite explicit in this regard). In light of the reigning liquidity shortage suffered by the
non-financial private sector, an injection of fresh money into the commercial banking
system with the narrow objective of opening access to working capital and trade finance
was sensibly judged as the way to go. Resources were to be transferred to the private
sector through a second-tier scheme -a second-floor institution, be it the central bank or a
national development bank, was in charge of allocating funds to first-floor financial
institutions to finance new private lending operations. On operational grounds, the
second-tier institution would acquire a fraction of the outstanding loan portfolio of the
first-tier institution, thus freeing up liquid assets that had to be immediately lent to private
borrowers.
Also it must be recalled that the Bank’s mission is fully complementary with the IMF
approach, which pursues activities more resembling of those of a supranational lender of
last resort, interacting directly with national fiscal and monetary authorities but not with
the private sector. Avoiding overlaps between multilaterals makes for a more efficient
international financial architecture.
(b) Were lending conditions too hard?
The interest rate (LIBOR plus 400 basis points) was atypically high for an IDB loan. The
same applies to the front-end fee of 1% on the full amount requested and the 0.75%
commitment fee on unused funds. Adding to this, in making new loans, financial
institutions would retain the associated credit risk while posting guarantees to the second-
tier institution. The ultimate question is whether these terms were self-defeating or were
actually coherent with the spirit of the program. With the benefit of hindsight, the
evidence leans towards the second interpretation.
Taking the analysis one step back, the IDB had to choose between more penalizing or
more benevolent loan terms.10 Under the former, willingness to participate would
presumably be discouraged, in both the number of signing countries and the amounts
requested. However, these more costly conditions would make it easier to identify the
countries with a more pressing need for fresh funds to support the private sector, which
was the primary goal of the program. For financial institutions going through an
interruption of their credit lines, LPGS must have been extremely valuable –common
knowledge asserts that “the most expensive loan is the one you don’t have”, meaning, in
more technical jargon, that the cost of unavailable funds is infinite.
On the other hand, softer conditions would make countries more enthusiastic to enter, but
for the wrong reasons in light of the declared objective of the line: financial institutions
may be biased in favor of taking on the offered loans not for boosting new flows of
10 As a matter of fact, the IDB did not have much of a choice at that point in time regarding the pricing of
this line, as the only quickly accessible funding for emergency purposes had a previously Board-approved
cost of 400 basis points above LIBOR. Anyway, the point merits the discussion, at least for future reference
in similar episodes.
private lending but to substitute for other less attractive sources of finance. For example,
they may want to sell some loans to the second-tier institution and make new loans
(meeting the LPGS requirements), but at the same time cancel more onerous liabilities
(reducing other assets, possibly including loans that are not under the scope of the
program). What is more, unable to replenish this pool of resources in the midst of the
crisis, the IDB was uncertain about whether the total volume at hand (6 billion dollars)
would be rapidly exhausted, so it was thought that some rationing mechanism would
improve the allocational efficiency of such potentially scarce funds.
In conclusion, the relatively hard loan terms were instrumental to the IDB’s aspiration to
screening countries with a speculative demand for funds from those facing an actual
financial constraint.
(c) Why was the line underutilized?
It is a fact that only 4.6% of the U$S6,000 million were effectively lent to IDB country
members (US$89.4 million to Jamaica and US$186.4 million to El Salvador). This
limited application of available funds might wrongly be interpreted as a failure of the
program. But the weakness of this claim lies on the implicit assumption that money was
badly needed. Let us recall that the loans were supposed to meet the demand from bank
clients. Three reasons may explain why loans were not intensely requested, as expected
in the first place:
(i) Final borrowers may have been reluctant to ask for new loans fearing that default risk
got amplified during the crisis, making it advisable to have the burden of debt services
under control. Also, the demand for credit was naturally held back by the economic
downturn. Furthermore, the competitive (meaning non-subsidized) interest rate -coupled
by short maturities and high collateral requirements- was an additional deterrent;
(ii) Macroeconomic figures in Section 1 showed that the volume of private credit was
growing at slower but still positive rates as the subprime crisis unraveled. Total liabilities
of the banking system -including deposits, foreign credit lines and new worth- did not
diminish either, except for El Salvador (-1.2% between August 2008 and June 2009) and
Jamaica (-15.8%). This implies that, on the whole, banks were not in need to make up for
lost financing sources. Also on the macroeconomic front, this was a short-lived crisis, and
by the time negotiations were under way, the need for money was already vanishing; and
(iii) Bank managers were actually who had to decide whether and how much to borrow
and, independently of their assessment of final credit demand, they might have been
against increasing their loan portfolio. In a context of uncertainty and high interest rates,
the risk of adverse selection (choosing low quality and risky borrowers) and moral hazard
(being exposed to the misuse of loans on the part of the borrowers) heightens. A good
indicator of a precautionary bank policy, by which banks refrain from lending, is the ratio
of cash balances to total assets. Between December 2007 and August 2008, the average
ratio for the banking system in our six-country sample was already high (16%), but still
increased to 18.6% in September 2008-June 2009.
All in all, the above claims provide some support to the view that the underutilization of
the line derives to a great extent from a weak credit demand, in the context of a short
crisis not having a dramatic effect on banking system’s health. Reinforcing our previous
statements, it is our sense that the lending terms were at most a second-order factor
behind the lack of interest in applying for and using the facility.
(d) Was LPGS in the end an actual production-enhancing mechanism or just an
insurance scheme in disguise?
Considering the premises under which the program was established, a serious concern for
the IDB was that entry into the program was not motivated by the goal of buying some
time and regaining market confidence, without the earnest intention of eventually taking
the loan. The level of front-end and commitment fees, as well as the 180-day validity of
the loan approval and the one-year limit for the banks to lend the money, were clauses
directed at ensuring the actual, quick use of funds. However, it was already mentioned
that, out of nine applying countries, only 5 subscribed the loan contract, with 2 of them
receiving partial installments.
Resuming prior arguments, the debate comes down to whether countries deliberately took
LPGS as an insurance device or they did not end up using the resources for more
legitimate reasons, spelled out in (c) above. Our position is that the limited use is related
to a lack of underlying demand for funds, and that the pure insurance motive played a
marginal role in the decision to apply for this funding.11
It is true that the high interest rate and fees drove countries to postpone the decision to
request the funding as much as possible, but this was consistent with the IDB intention to
make actual productive loans instead of opening a contingent line. The fact that some
countries withdrew from the initial agreement does not mean that the hard loan
conditions backfired on the IDB, but that the need for funds was not sufficiently intense,
and so countries were able to cope with the crisis with other resources at hand. According
to IDB team leaders, countries were torn between the desire of avoiding a costly credit
line and -in light of the first-come, first-served rule- the risk of losing access to resources
that could prove to be extremely valuable later on. One should bear in mind that at the
peak of the crisis, the extreme market volatility made it virtually impossible to estimate
future financing needs even over the shortest time horizon. Authorities themselves must
have been uncertain about whether they would need to use the money and when. Under
these circumstances, it is quite unlikely that governments had applied knowing
beforehand that they will not channel the funds to the private sector.12,13
To close, should one evaluate LPGS as an overall success or a failure? A quick, acid test,
less technical than ours but by all means highly dependable, is the opinion of national
authorities in office at the time of LPGS implementation. We consulted with some of
11 However, we do believe that LPGS acted in practice as a macroeconomic insurance device. Our previous
econometric results attest to LPGS success in mitigating macroeconomic uncertainty. This is true even for
the mere announcement of negotiations and for rather small disbursements. This suggests that LPGS
worked out regardless of its intended productive use. This is precisely the confidence effect associated to an
insurance.
12 Strictly speaking, this facility cannot be labeled as an insurance mechanism. An insurance contract sets a
premium to be paid in advance and payment is contingent to the realization of the event. Also, in this case
the event (the crisis) was already in motion -although chances were that it could be prolonged over time.
On the contrary, LPGS was a conventional loan with clear guidelines about disbursement.
13 Anyway, even after discarding this hypothesis, one must say that a credit line serving as insurance should
not be viewed negatively, but the opposite. If an insurance is set up, and its existence allows to strengthen
market confidence without any actual flow of money, such insurance should be consider utterly successful.
them from El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Uruguay. They unanimously expressed a very
positive viewpoint on LPGS as a crisis-containing mechanism. Of course, they mentioned
that a successful anti-crisis package needed of all four following ingredients: (i)
Satisfactory initial macroeconomic conditions, for instance, an acceptable buffer stock of
international reserves and a comfortable fiscal position, (ii) A relatively low exposure to
particular external shocks, in terms of export markets and import products diversification
and low short-term external debt ratios; (iii) Coordinated multilateral assistance
(including not only the IDB but also the IMF, the WB, and other institutions such as CAF
and FLAR); and (iv) Sound and pragmatic fiscal and monetary policies over the course of
the crisis. As part of (iii), they claim that LPGS was an effective and timely instrument.
This anecdotal evidence, combined with our event study results, attests to the success of
LPGS in opening LAC countries a credit line at a crucial moment where they were
unable to tap private markets.
Annex 1: Use of disbursed funds in El Salvador and Jamaica
The following table summarizes the application of LPGS funds disbursed in El Salvador
and Jamaica, based on IDB and local newspapers information:
Jamaica El Salvador
US$ 300.000.000 US$ 400.000.000
US$ 89.4 million US$ 186.4 million
Development Bank of Jamaica
(DBJ)
 Banco Multisectorial de Inversiones
(BMI), acting on behalf of the Banco
Central de Reserva (BCR)
4 out of the 7 authorized financial
institutions: National Commercial
Bank (NCB), First Global Bank,
Pan Caribbean Financial Services
and the Export Import (EXIM)
Bank.
Banco Agrícola, Banco de América
Central, Banco de Fomento
Agropecuario, Banco G&T Continental,
Banco Hipotecario, HSBC, Scotiabank,
Citibank, Banco de los Trabajadores
Salvadoreños and Banco Izalqueño.
65 1,000 (as of 04/12/09)
US$1,375,400 US$186,000
Agriculture (13%), Industry (34%),
Services (53%)
Agriculture (6%), Industry (35%),
Services (59%)
Working capital (93.6%) and trade
credit (6.4%) Working capital and trade credit
Sources: IDB and local newspapers.
Country
Approved Loan Amount
Disbursed Amount
Second Floor Institution
Participating First Floor
Financial Institutions
Financed expenses
Number of Loans Granted
Average Loan Size
Sectoral Allocation of Loans
Annex 2: Official Sources of Information
The following government and multilateral sources were searched for macroeconomic
data:
Table A2.1
National Government Sources of Information
Source/Country Costa Rica El Salvador Jamaica Panama Dominican Rep. Uruguay
National Statistics Institute
website www.inec.go.cr www.digestyc.gob.sv www.statinja.com
www.contraloria.g
ob.pa/ www.one.gob.do www.ine.gub.uy
Central bank website www.bccr.fi.cr www.bcr.gob.sv www.boj.org.jm www.banconal.co
m.pa/
www.bancentral.g
ov.do www.bcu.gub.uy
Ministry of Economy www.hacienda.g
o.cr
www.minec.gob.sv
www.mh.gob.sv
http://www.mof.go
v.jm/ www.mef.gob.pa
www.hacienda.go
v.do www.mef.gub.uy
Bank regulator
http://www.suge
f.fi.cr/
http://www.cona
ssif.fi.cr/
http://www.ssf.gob.sv/ http://www.superb
ancos.gob.pa/
http://www.supba
nco.gov.do/
Bank association
http://www.cam
aradebancos.fi.c
r/
http://www.abc.
fi.cr/
www.abansa.org.sv www.jba.org.jm http://www.asocia
cionbancaria.com/
http://www.aba.or
g.do/ABA2/defau
lt.asp
www.aebu.org.uy
Stock Exchange www.bolsacr.co
m
www.bves.com.sv www.jamstockex.c
om
www.panabolsa.co
m
http://www.bolsar
d.com/app/do/fro
ntpage.aspx
www.bvm.com.uy
Was high frequency data
obtained after direct
requests to central bank
statistics department?
Only monthly Only bi-monthly for
selected time series Only monthly No reply Yes Yes
Does the country adhere to
IMF's SDDS? Yes Yes No No No Yes
Table A2.2
Multilateral Sources of Information
Source Internet site
IFS (International Financial Statistics) http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/
IADB (Inter American Development
Bank): Latin Macro Watch (LMW)
http://www.iadb.org/res/lmw_countrytables.cfm?l
anguage=Spanish&ID_SEC=2
SECMCA (Secretaría Ejecutiva del
Consejo Monetario Centroamericano) http://www.secmca.org/Indice.html
CEMLA (Centro de Estudios Monetarios
Latinoamericanos) http://www.cemla.org/
FELABAN (Federación Latinoamericana
de Bancos) http://www.felaban.com/
FLAR (Fondo Latinoamericano de
Reservas) http://www.flar.net/contenido/default.aspx
World Bank http://www.worldbank.org/
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